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INTRODUCTION
Are human rights expanding over time? Christopher Stone, Peter Singer,
and many others hold that they are and that this is a good thing. In a famous
article and book, Stone points out that in early times, human beings
recognized rights only for members of their immediate family or clan.1
Gradually, our circle of concern expanded to include members of other clans,
then foreigners, women, Jews, and members of other races. Stone writes that
we will eventually come to endow natural objects, such as rocks, trees, fish,
and rivers, with rights, so that one day the entire natural environment will
receive protection in its own right, not merely because this will benefit
humanity.2
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3. E.g., PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: ETHICS AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 169-70 (1981)
(advocating for the development of an ethical system based on the interrelatedness of all sentient creatures);
see also PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 27-86, 163-89 (1977) (discussing vegetarianism and changing
relationships with animals).
4. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, §§ VIII-IX (J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson eds., Sir
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1980) (describing a number of virtues, specifically those relating to
relationships).
5. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 47, at 216-17 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (positing a principle of universalizability in human ethics).
6. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971) (proposing that we should act as though
behind a “veil of ignorance”).
7. See LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 34-69 (2007).
8. Hunt discusses empathy, fellow feeling, and similar emotions by which we identify with the fate
of others. Id. at 32-33, 35, 40-42, 48, 50.
9. Even earlier, in 1215, the Magna Carta formalized certain rights, namely those of the barons
against the English king. Id. at 21, 114.
10. Hunt discusses this milestone and its role in expanding discourse about rights. Id. at 21, 25, 64,
115-16, 126-27.
11. Hunt analyzes this document and its influence on universal human rights. Id. at 17, 19, 203-08;
app. 223-29.
12. Hunt discusses the impact of new forms of text, particularly fiction and portraiture. Id. at 33-34,
39, 64-65.
13. Hunt describes current limits of empathy. See id. at 18, 28, 209-14.
14. Hunt discusses the inexorable advance of human rights and their expansion over time. See id.
In a similar fashion, moral philosopher Peter Singer posits an expanding
circle of sympathies that will one day extend to nonhuman creatures, entailing
vegetarianism and changes in the way we relate to household pets and
laboratory animals.  Aristotle,  Immanuel Kant,  John Rawls,  and many3 4 5 6
others have also urged that we broaden the scope of those to whom we owe
respect and equal treatment.
But what propels this gradually widening arc? Lynn Hunt, professor of
history at UCLA, believes that the answer has to do with new kinds of
reading.  With the advent of the epistolary novel around 1750, readers learned7
that persons of different classes and groups had feelings, hopes, dreams, and
life plans very much like their own.  These new sympathies culminated in8
milestones such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,9
the Declaration of Independence,  and the United Nation’s Universal10
Declaration of Human Rights.  Over time, new forms of reading—and11
viewing and listening—contributed to empathy, the ability to see oneself in
others.  This process, however, is incomplete. We have yet to see certain12
outcast groups—notably criminals, ideological opponents, and wartime
enemies—as like us.  According to Hunt, however, we will one day “go the13
limit” and recognize universal human rights for all.14
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at 18-21, 213-14.
15. In brief, moral advance is virtually unstoppable because it turns on the increased knowledge of
our fellow human beings and their condition. The forces propelling it are knowledge and reading or other
forms of vicarious experience.
16. See id. It shows, in short, how to get an “ought” (a normative statement) from an “is” (a
descriptive statement). See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA ¶ 10, at 61-62 (Thomas Baldwin ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1903) (labeling this difficulty the “naturalistic fallacy”).
17. STEPHEN CRANE, THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE (1895).
Hunt’s book is inspiring, edifying, and full of rich historical and literary
detail. It treats moral advance as inexorable and explains what forces propel
it.  It provides a powerful argument in favor of literature, especially fiction.15
It also connects morality with knowledge in a relationship that many have
merely posited without showing the precise connection.16
This essay first outlines Hunt’s argument for universal human rights and
then poses a question she leaves open: Why have human rights advanced
further in Europe than in the United States? Part II illustrates this disparity on
a number of fronts, including the death penalty, abolition of slavery, rights of
women, and environmental protection. Part III posits an explanation for this
disparity.
My thesis is that reading does indeed build empathy as Hunt proposes.
But early American fiction celebrated a different set of heroes from those who
emerged in European fiction. These American heroes included settlers who
tamed a wild land, Indian fighters, plantation owners who managed teams of
slaves, and soldiers who fought the British and French in the name of
independence and Manifest Destiny. American fiction, then, created empathy,
but of a different kind from that of a Dickens novel, which taught
identification with factory workers or the poor. Captivity narratives and short
stories such as The Red Badge of Courage  helped set the young nation on the17
headlong, expansionist path that it pursues, to some extent, even today.
Part IV leaves the realm of discourse and shows how material forces also
shaped the development of rights consciousness in the new nation. I show that
empathy proved an advantage—and so advanced rapidly—but only in
mercantile centers such as New England, where understanding what another
person wanted facilitated useful exchanges. In the South and West this
advantage did not set in nearly so strongly. Thus, both its literature and its way
of doing business converged to make the United States a place of limited
rights and sympathies even when the rest of the world was rapidly expanding
them. The review’s conclusion offers some thoughts for reformers interested
in encouraging the movement toward universal human rights.
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18. HUNT, supra note 7, at 15-16.
19. Id. at 15-18, 21, 77-78.
20. Id. at 18, 28.
21. Id. at 17-18, 20-23.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 27-30.
24. Id. at 38.
25. Id. at 27-32.
26. Torture, of course, re-emerged in national consciousness with revelations of events at Abu
Ghraib and the military prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing how changing notions
of the sanctity of the human body led to an aversion to torture), 208; see infra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text.
I. INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights, according to Lynn Hunt, are an unusual form of moral
currency. Trumping wealth, social status, friendship, and other particularities,
they inhere in all persons simply on account of our common humanity.18
They are, however, a relatively recent phenomenon. Although the British
issued a Bill of Rights in 1689 and a Magna Carta even before that, rights did
not acquire anything like their current broad scope until a century later.  Even19
then, slaves, criminals, the propertyless, women, religious minorities, and
other large groups were excluded.  Only with certain modern documents,20
such as the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, did society declare, at least
as an aspiration, that rights are inalienable and universal.21
Hunt’s book describes the expansion of human rights thus far, and what
humanity must still do to complete the story. Central to her account is the role
of feeling and emotion. A person becomes aware that a human right is at issue
when he or she feels horrified by its violation.  This emotion, sometimes22
called empathy or fellow feeling, is closely tied to notions of bodily integrity.
Thus, part of Hunt’s study concerns changing ideas about the human body.23
Notions of hygiene, modesty, and personal delicacy thus occupy central places
in her book. As recently as the late Middle Ages, for example, Madame
Duchatelet regularly undressed in front of her male servants, whom she did
not consider fully human.  Empathy—the perception that others are like24
oneself—required a shift in attitude toward the autonomy and wellbeing of
others.25
The forces propelling these advances were complex and included new
convictions about the sanctity of the human body, as well as an aversion to
mutilation and torture.  They also included the development of bodily26
delicacy and the advent of disgust toward such things as spitting or sneezing
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27. Id. at 82, 111-12.
28. Id. at 81-82.
29. Id. at 33-34.
30. Id. at 33-34.
31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 20-22.
33. Id. at 35-69.
34. Id. at 40-42.
35. Id. at 35-36.
in public without covering one’s mouth.  Ultimately, Enlightenment notions27
of the body as a temple of the human spirit culminated in the movement for
the abolition of slavery, torture, and other forms of cruelty.28
Hunt’s introductory section explains that she will consider the historical
interaction of texts and developing notions of human autonomy and empathy.
As Hunt puts it: “Reading accounts of torture or epistolary novels translated
into brain changes and came back out as new concepts about the organization
of social and political life.”  For Hunt, “new kinds of reading (and viewing29
and listening) created new individual experiences (empathy), which in turn
made possible new social and political concepts (human rights).”  Her focus30
is on “individual minds,” by which she means ordinary people, not only the
great thinkers and writers of the time.  It is also on the means by which31
human rights achieved three interlocking prerequisites—naturalness, equality
(i.e., the same for everyone), and universality.32
A succeeding chapter, the heart of the book, explains Hunt’s thesis about
the role of literature in advancing human rights. If a right is something that
causes an emotion in us—outrage—when we experience its violation, what
enables ordinary people to develop the type of identification with other people
that is the foundation for human rights? Chapter 1, “Torrents of Emotion:
Reading Novels and Imagining Equality,” focuses on three epistolary novels:
Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-48), and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Julie (1761).33
The typical epistolary novel proceeds in the form of a series of letters, an
approach that offers a heightened sense of identification with the protagonists
who seem like real people, not fictional characters.  Rousseau’s Julie, for34
example, is in love with her tutor but marries an older soldier, Womar, who
had saved her father’s life. Ultimately, by the time of her death, which occurs
after she saves her young son from drowning, she learns to love her tutor
platonically, as a friend.  Hunt writes that Rousseau’s readers identified35
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36. Id. at 36-37.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 38-39.
39. Id. at 39.
40. Id. at 39, 56.
41. Id. at 39-40.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 40.
44. On the role of empathy in the law, see, for example, Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and
False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1996). On the role of passions generally in the law, see THE PASSIONS
OF THE LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999). Id. at 40-41, 43-48.
45. HUNT, supra note 7, at 42-47.
intensely with Julie. Many wrote to Rousseau, noting that they had devoured
the book, or cried, even howled at Julie’s death.36
While the book revolved around love and passion, not human rights, Hunt
posits that Julie “opened up its readers to a new form of empathy” by allowing
them to experience vicarious emotions across lines of class, sex, and nation.37
It also elevated ordinary people, like the protagonists and servants, to the
status of heroes.  These three great novels created a “sense of equality and38
empathy through passionate involvement in the narrative.”  While strict proof39
is impossible, Hunt notes that the books appeared immediately preceding the
appearance of the concept of “the rights of man” and seem bound up with it.40
In the course of discussing these novels, Hunt expands on her thoughts
about empathy. She believes that this touchstone emotion is biologically
predisposed (although some of us have more of it than others) but also shaped
by particular cultures.  Development of empathy also requires social41
interaction.  Readers of eighteenth-century novels received an introduction42
to people outside their particular class or social circle. This allowed them to
relate to people who did not seem, at first glance, “like them,” giving new
context to the idea of equality.  Although novel-reading was not the only43
event that helped expand human sympathies, it was a key one.44
Hunt’s discussion of the other two novels is somewhat briefer. In
Richardson’s Pamela, the main character writes to her mother of how her
employer attempted to seduce her. The epistolary form—an intense, personal
letter to a close friend—allowed the author to spend as much time as he
wished on a character’s inner thoughts and emotions, which is not always
possible in other narratives, such as plays. Pamela grew to be immensely
popular in England and France.45
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46. Id. at 46-48.
47. Id. at 50-54.
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 57.
50. Id. at 59.
51. Id. at 59-60.
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. at 63-64.
54. Id. at 68.
55. Id. at 70-112.
56. Id. at 70.
Richardson’s Clarissa came in seven volumes, each running several
hundred pages in length. The heroine runs away with Lovelace to escape the
cloddish suitor proposed by her family. Although Lovelace betrays Clarissa
by drugging and raping her, he then repents and proposes marriage. Clarissa
dies brokenhearted, her sense of self violated. In letters to Richardson, readers
poured out their grief and distress for “the dear girl” or “the divine Clarissa.”46
These three novels did not find universal favor. Some clerics accused
them of undermining morality and the principles of social order.  They47
warned that reading them could encourage readers to act on their emotions and
passions, “sow[ing] discontent in the minds . . . of servants and young girls.”48
Serious supporters included Thomas Jefferson, who recommended them to a
friend for their ability to imprint “both the principles and practice of virtue.”49
Hunt explains that she focused on novels with “female heroines . . .
because their quest for autonomy could never fully succeed.”  Readers50
learned that women, who at that time still lacked legal and social rights,
aspired to autonomy, just as men did.  An examination of the path of divorce51
law illustrates her point. England, in contrast to other Protestant countries,
made it nearly impossible to get a divorce between 1700 and 1857. After the
French revolutionaries instituted divorce, dissolution rates grew to about 1800
a year.  After gaining independence, the colonies also liberalized the practice,52
although a little later.  As Hunt explains, “Learning to empathize opened the53
path to human rights, but it did not ensure that everyone would be able to take
that path right away.”54
Another important chapter, “Bone of Their Bone: Abolishing Torture,”
focuses on the abolition of harsh punishments, particularly in France.  Hunt55
begins with an account of the death by torture of Jean Calas, a 64-year-old
French Protestant accused of murdering his son to prevent him from
converting to Catholicism.  Calas’s torture proceeded in two steps. In the56
first, his accusers bound his wrists tightly to a bar behind him in an effort to
284 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:277
57. Contemporary readers will, of course, recall the controversy over waterboarding as a technique
of enemy interrogation. See, e.g., Sara A. Carter, Hayden Aims for ‘a More Cohesive CIA,’ WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2008, at A1.
58. HUNT, supra note 7, at 72.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 73-74.
61. Id. at 75-76.
62. Id. at 80-81, 103-08.
63. Id. at 93-95.
64. Id. at 81-82.
65. Id. at 82.
66. Id. at 82-83.
force him to name his accomplices. When he refused, they stretched him with
cranks and pulleys that drew his arms up while weights held his feet in place.
After he still refused to name his confederates, his interrogators tied him to a
bench while forcing water from pitchers down his throat.  Calas died57
proclaiming his innocence.58
Voltaire brought attention to Calas’s mistreatment in a pamphlet and book
in which he used the phrase, “human rights.”  Voltaire’s outrage focused,59
however, not so much on torture itself but on the religious bigotry motivating
the judges and police.  Nevertheless, his work started a social re-evaluation60
of torture, and by the late 1700s several nations, including Sweden, Prussia,
Austria, and Bohemia, had abolished it.  Enlightenment works, such as61
Beccaria’s Essays on Crimes and Punishment (1764), rejected judicial torture
and even the death penalty.  The public spectacles that accompanied62
executions came to seem tawdry.63
Hunt notes that at first, even the educated elite did not see a connection
between cruel punishment and the new language of rights. This came only
with new concerns for the human body; Hunt notes that “[b]odies gained a
more positive value as they became more separate, more self-possessed, and
more individualized over the course of the eighteenth century, while violations
of them increasingly aroused negative reactions.”64
These changes in public attitudes accompanied new consensuses on
behaviors that were no longer appropriate in public, including urination,
defecation, disdain for eating from common bowls, and sharing beds with
someone other than one’s partner.  For Hunt, these changes signaled “the65
advent of the self-enclosed individual, whose boundaries” required respect in
social interaction.  Self-possession and autonomy brought increasing self-66
discipline, including the use of handkerchiefs for coughing and sneezing, and
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67. Id. at 30, 82, 111.
68. Id. at 30, 85-92.
69. See id. at 112, 135-45.
70. See id. at 113-45, 146-75 (“They Have Set a Great Example: Declaring Rights”; “There Will Be
No End To It: The Consequences of Declaring”).
71. Id. at 116, 122, 125, 132, 139-43.
72. Id. at 150.
73. Id. at 150-60, 165-75.
74. Id. at 160.
75. Id. at 160-67.
76. Id. at 164-67.
77. Id. at 166.
78. Id. at 166-67.
79. Id. at 167-75.
80. Id. at 168.
listening to music or the opera in silence.  An increased interest in portraits,67
even by ordinary individuals, also accompanied these changes.68
Official, state-imposed torture came to an end when “the traditional
framework of pain and personhood fell apart, to be replaced, bit by bit, by a
new framework, in which individuals owned their bodies, had rights to their
separateness and to bodily inviolability, and recognized in other people the
same passions, sentiments, and sympathies in themselves.”69
Subsequent chapters  trace the expansion of human rights through70
various formal proclamations, charters, and bills and show how, once they
gained a toehold, human rights would cascade—gather momentum and sweep
in new groups, such as Jews, women, the propertyless, and countries, in a
manner previously unthinkable.  In particular, Hunt believes that “the French71
revolution, more than any other event, revealed that human rights possessed
an inner logic.”  Granting rights to one minority group, Protestants, for72
example, would place the issue of the rights of Jews on the table but not, for
instance, those of women or blacks.  But the “bulldozer force of the73
revolutionary logic of rights”  soon turned, in France at least, to the issue of74
free blacks and slaves.  By 1793, the French colonies were in upheaval. Slave75
revolts in Saint Domingue forced the deputies to comply with their demands
in order to hold onto the colony.  An ex-slave, Toussaint L’Ouverture,76
invoked the language of rights.  Without the original declaration of rights in77
the mother country, Hunt writes, France’s total abolition of slavery in 1794
would not have come about.78
Hunt closes with a discussion of women’s rights,  beginning with early79
advocacy by Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman
(1792). Hunt then proceeds through reforms in inheritance and divorce laws.80
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81. Id. at 176-214.
82. Id. at 181-86.
83. Id. at 186-94.
84. Id. at 197-201.
85. See Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (discussing disagreement between critical legal studies scholars and
scholars of critical race theory over the role of rights and rights discourse in protecting outsider groups).
86. HUNT, supra note 7, at 204.
87. Id. at 208.
88. Id. at 209-10.
89. Id. at 213.
Hunt’s final chapter, “The Soft Power of Humanity: Why Human Rights
Failed, Only to Succeed,”  traces the zigzag path of human rights. Here, Hunt81
argues that human rights are at times stymied by forces like nationalism or
biology. Nationalism, Hunt argues, reserves rights for just one people
(Germans for example).  Biology can at times draw pseudo-classifications82
among levels of humanity.83
Although Hunt does mention that early socialists distrusted rights as
egoistic,  she might also have mentioned the recent debate between critical84
legal studies and critical race theory. Critical legal studies took a dim view of
rights, while critical race theory found them to be a source of inspiration and
a rallying point for resistance.85
Hunt’s final pages discuss the world wars, noting that the crimes of the
Nazis made inclusion of human rights in the United Nations charter seem
imperative. She concedes that many such instruments lack enforcement
mechanisms  and that torture continues to be carried out (not least of all by86
the United States).  She concedes, as well, that “modern forms of87
communication have expanded the means of empathizing with others, [but]
they have not been able to ensure that humans will act on the basis of that
fellow feeling.”  The argument over who—and what—deserves rights (the88
disabled? homosexuals? animals?) continues. For Hunt, however, no structure
is better suited to examine such questions than international courts,
governmental bodies, and conventions. Moreover, “rights are best defended
in the end by feelings, convictions, and actions of multitudes of individuals
who demand responses that accord with their inner sense of outrage.”89
II. RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Hunt takes us on a tour that is at one and the same time informative and
encouraging. Rights are expanding; human attitudes to bodily integrity and
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90. See generally Barbara C. George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide
Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 488 (2000).
91. See generally Jessica W. Miller, Comment, Solving the Latin American Sovereign Debt Crisis,
22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 677, 691 (2001).
92. Nazism and the Holocaust come to mind, as well as England’s role in the slave trade. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES (2002).
93. See generally JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 96-284 (2d ed. 2007).
94. Hunt notes that the United States lagged in affording rights to women. HUNT, supra note 7, at
172. See also infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
95. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 13-43 (5th ed. 2004) (chronicling the
repeal). France was one of the earliest to abolish the practice in one of its colonies in 1791, LAURENT
DUBOIS, AVENGERS OF THE NEW WORLD: THE STORY OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION (2005). See HUNT,
supra note 7, at 166-67 (French abolition in 1794). See generally id. at 119-20 (brief discussion of
scholarly influence on slavery); STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH THE HEAVENS MAY FALL: THE LANDMARK
TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HUMAN SLAVERY (2006) (discussing the histories of the abolitionist
movement in different countries, namely, England and the United States).
96. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 93, at 262-84 (“Comparative Approaches,” which covers
reparations to indigenous populations).
97. See generally Dana Z. Falstrom, Thought Versus Action, 58 ME. L. REV. 337, 363 n.139 (2006)
(citing Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Gives Cold Shoulder to Treaties, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A22).
98. On the U.S. reluctance to join the worldwide movement for women’s rights, see Jeffery Huffines,
United States Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 641 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Constant Brand, U.S. Rejects EU-Asia Emissions Reduction, AP PRESS, May 29, 2007,
available at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8PE57FG2&show_article=1 (discussing American
slowness to act against global warming, including the Kyoto protocol).
autonomy are strengthening; and every so often, humanity incorporates new
worldwide consensus in the form of a document, consolidating a century or
more of gains.
Yet, Hunt’s book can easily leave her American readers (this one, at least)
with a nagging feeling: The United States seems to lag behind the rest of the
world with respect to practically every advance she describes. Although the
United States has at times acted generously (e.g., the Marshall Plan  and the90
recent bailout of the Argentine economy ), and Europe has at times acted91
abominably,  we have more often brought up the rear with respect to human92
rights (e.g., the slaughtering of the Indians and the enslavement of Africans ).93
Although it is easy to rationalize that all colonial nations were guilty of similar
barbarities, in many cases we practiced them more wholeheartedly and gave
them up later than other nations.94
We were not among the first dozen nations to abolish slavery,  and both95
Canada and Australia have made formal amends to their indigenous
populations exceeding what the United States has done.  At the same time,96
we have resisted signing treaties banning genocide,  protecting women’s97
rights,  and safeguarding against global warming.  The United States,98 99
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100. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Lesser Evil, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1517-18 (2006) (book
review of: MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004))
(discussing the United States’ position on pre-emptive war); see also HUNT, supra note 7, at 201-03
(reporting that the United States initially opposed the sweeping rights language of the U.N. Charter).
101. On the duty to retreat, see Joseph Beale, Duty to Retreat from Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L.
REV. 567 (1902); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS 127-28 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEATON].
102. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 101, at 127-28.
103. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see generally Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson,
Mental Capacity and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 351 (2006).
104. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2002); see generally Enrico Pagnanelli, Children as Adults:
The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 125 (2007).
105. Great Britain’s last recorded execution took place in 1964, the same year the country abolished
the death penalty for the crime of murder. Parliament removed the death penalty from the country’s statute
books in 1997 and abolished it entirely in 1998. See French Cabinet Backs Ending Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1981, at A5 (reporting that France was the last West European country to abolish the death
penalty in 1981). Thirty-eight U.S. states continue to execute criminals following the Supreme Court’s
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976. The United Nations Human Rights Commission voted in favor
of a worldwide moratorium on executions in 1991. U.N. Panel Votes for Ban on Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1999, at A4.
106. See generally Daniel Lazare, Stars and Bars, THE NATION, Aug. 27, 2007, at 9; Adam Liptak,
Inmate Count In U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1.
107. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
apparently alone in the world, reserves the right to engage in pre-emptive war
without consulting allies or securing the permission of the United Nations.100
Even in areas not covered by treaty but by common law, the United States
has often adopted a less encompassing version than that which prevailed in
other common-law jurisdictions. For example, American law generally
recognized no duty to retreat.  That is to say, a homeowner or other person101
who believed himself or herself under murderous attack could simply fire
away, without first issuing a warning or backing up.102
The United States continued to execute the mentally retarded until 2002103
and juveniles until 2005,  well after most nations banned both practices.104
Indeed, most advanced nations have rejected capital punishment entirely,
whereas we seem a long way from doing so.  We incarcerate such a large105
percentage of our population that we lead the developed world in this respect,
as even the U.S.-based Amnesty International has noted.106
The United States maintained—and enforced—dozens of laws against
interracial marriage until 1967, when Loving v. Virginia finally struck them
down.  Although history shows that Britons displayed mixed feelings about107
miscegenation, with some vigorously condemning it, no laws ever expressly
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108. See generally Roxann Wheeler, The Complexion of Desire: Racial Ideology and Mid-
Eighteenth-Century British Novels, 32 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 309, 314 (1998).
109. On England’s Civil Partnership Act (2005), see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/
ukpga_20040033_en_1. See also Suzanne Daley, France Gives Legal Status to Unmarried Couples, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A3.
110. At the time of writing, only a handful of U.S. states (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New
Jersey, California, and New Hampshire) provided anything similar. See Marriage and Relationship
Recognition, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
111. See generally Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Health Care Horror Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008,
at A23.
112. See generally WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN 45-163 (1970); Allen R.
Sanderson, Child-Labor Legislation and the Labor Force Participation of Children, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 297
(1974).
113. See generally Clark Nardinelli, Child Labor and the Factory Acts, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 739, 741
(1980).
114. See Abby F. Janoff, Rights of the Pregnant Child vs. Rights of the Unborn Under the
Conventions on the Rights of the Child, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 175-88 (2004) (noting that many
commonwealth countries provided abortion “virtually on request” long before the United States did).
115. See, e.g., The Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c. 60 (U.K.) (decriminalizing private sexual acts
between consenting adults over the age of twenty-one); see also Committee on the Offences of Homosexual
Affairs and Prostitution, 1957, Wolfenden Report (U.K.) (proposing legalization of homosexuality and
sodomy). In the United States, the Supreme Court did not rule that state laws criminalizing homosexual
activity were unconstitutional until it decided Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
116. See, e.g., Tom Wright, U.S. Defends Rights Record Before U.N. Panel in Geneva, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2006, at A1 (reporting that over two dozen U.N. officials called American officials before a U.N.
panel to explain the country’s treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay); see also
HUNT, supra note 7, at 208 (noting the same); Paul Shiner, A Deliberate Torture Policy, THE GUARDIAN,
June 14, 2007 (reporting that the House of Lords voted to ban torture of prisoners while in British custody).
117. On the U.S. position (vis-à-vis that of other nations) regarding detention and the Geneva
Accords, see Jack Goldsmith, The Laws in Wartime, SLATE, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/
2187870/; Dan Froomkin, Call it the Abu Ghraib Memo, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 2, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2008/04/02/BL2008040202171.html.
prohibited the practice.  Furthermore, in the Civil Partnership Act (2005),108
Great Britain gave registered same-sex couples rights similar to marriage.109
Conversely, only a handful of U.S. states have provided the same right to
same-sex couples.110
The United States, as most readers know, is the only industrialized nation
in the world without some form of universal health insurance.111
The United States was slow to forbid child labor. Although a number of
states enacted protective legislation between 1880 and 1910, federal statutes
only began to appear in the 1910s.  Britain, by contrast, put in place Factory112
Acts to decrease child labor abuse in mills in 1833, 1844, and 1874.113
A comparison of women’s reproductive rights,  punishment of sodomy114
and homosexuality,  torture,  detention of enemy combatants,  and115 116 117
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118. On extraordinary rendition and its standing under international law, see Congressional Press
Release, Apr. 2, 2008; Biden: Justice Dep’t Memo Shocks the Conscience.
119. Great Britain, for example, prohibits ownership of primates as pets, forbids cockfighting, and
prohibits “puppy mills.” See Dep’t for Env. Food & Rural Affairs, UK (DEFRA), available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/domestic/index.htm (discussing the ban on puppy mills). See also
Daniel Foggo & Matthew Campbell, British Fans Flock to French Cockfights, THE SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Jan. 22, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article717208.ece
(discussing the British ban on cockfighting).
120. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust:
The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673 (2005); John Dvorske
et al., Animals Running at Large, Open Range Doctrine, 3B C.J.S. § 266 (2007). See also Paul Meller, Ban
on Animal Tests for Cosmetics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A8 (discussing the European Parliament’s
2003 law forbidding the practice of cosmetic testing on animals).
121. Dvorske et al., supra note 120.




125. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1907) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited the discharge of a worker because of union membership); see also Clyde W. Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) (discussing
the history of employment at will in the United States and advocating legislation to limit the ability of an
extraordinary rendition  also shows differences, rarely in the United States’118
favor.
Animal rights and protection receive much more attention in England and
other European countries than in the United States.  Many American states119
adopted open-range laws that allowed farm animals to roam freely.  For120
example, a vegetable farmer wishing to protect her crop was required to build
a fence, as animal owners were under no duty to fence them in.  By the same121
token, British common law diverged from the U.S. version regarding capture
of animals.  In England, the Crown exercised authority over wild animals122
and their habitat. Extensive laws limited hunting, fishing, and trapping. The
colonies, and especially the United States, instead applied the rule of capture,
under which all these activities were unregulated sources of income, food, and
clothing. To both American citizens and the judiciary, the wilderness and its
vast animal life were not cherished resources to be protected but instead an
“enemy to be conquered and tamed.”  The capture rule entailed, as well,123
relaxation of prohibitions against trespass and the right of landowners to
exclude hunters.  English law, by contrast, deemed the right of the124
landowner superior to that of the hunter.
One thinks, as well, of doctrines such as employment at will (under which
workers can be fired for any reason), which received its fullest expression in
the United States,  and limitations on the rule of no-duty-of-rescue, which125
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employer to dismiss employees unjustly); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States,
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000) (arguing against the doctrine, which allows even unjust dismissals).
126. See generally Damien Schiff, Samaritans—Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Analysis, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77 (2005).
127. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
128. Id.
129. See Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo: Bargaining in Good Faith and
Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964).
130. See Kessler, supra note 127; Kessler & Fine, supra note 129.
131. See, infra Part III.A. and accompanying notes.
132. See id.
133. HUNT, supra note 7, at 38-69.
did not.  And when doctrines such as unconscionability,  contracts of126 127
adhesion,  and the duty to bargain in good faith  finally entered U.S. law,128 129
they did so via European expatriate law professors like Friedrich Kessler.130
The resourceful reader will undoubtedly be able to think of many other
respects in which U.S. law exhibits a rough-hewn, individualistic quality
compared to that of the rest of the world. Although this country has
occasionally been in the forefront of humanitarian relief and, even more
rarely, led the way in establishing human rights law, it has generally lagged
behind the record of the most advanced nations. Why might this be so?
III. THE UNSTEADY MARCH OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXPLAINING THE RECORD
If U.S. progress in recognizing human rights has been uneven, what
explains its halting pace? Undoubtedly, many forces contributed, but I focus
on two: the new country’s literature and its way of doing business. Early
American fiction, more than the European kind, glorified war, Indian killing,
and settlement.  In turn, the empathy that American readers developed131
focused on warriors, settlers, Indian killers, and plantation owners who
managed large numbers of slaves—not on homeless people, Dickensian
factory workers, or the slaves themselves.  Novels and short fiction can132
develop empathy, as Hunt points out, but that empathy may be for the
exploiting class just as easily as for the exploited.  The former type of133
empathy was in evidence in the United States to a much greater degree than
it was in England or France, possibly because the United States began as a
resource-rich society interested in extraction.
Material forces also played a role. Consider, for example, the function of
empathy in a society’s economy. That faculty conferred an advantage on its
possessor since one could figure out what another person might be feeling and
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138. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Cure Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260-75, 1277-88
(1992) (describing types of racial depiction and stereotyping and the difficulty of countering them under
reigning First Amendment law).
139. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (David W. Griffith Corp. 1915). See Russell Merritt, D. W. Griffith’s
The Birth of a Nation: Going after Little Sister, in CLOSE VIEWINGS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF NEW FILM
act accordingly.  But this advantage only accrued, at least strongly, in a134
mercantile society such as England, whose economy was based on trade. A
merchant, for example, could quickly grasp what his or her clients, customers,
and employees wanted, and offer something in return. Everyone profited from
this kind of knowledge.  This was true, of course, in the Northeastern cities135
of the United States, such as Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. But in the
agrarian South, a plantation owner did not need to use empathy in
understanding his slaves. He could use coercion instead.  The same was true136
in the West and on the frontier. Settlers needed little empathy to understand
the Indians or appreciate old-growth forests. The challenge facing them was
to kill or relocate the former and cut down the latter as quickly as possible to
make way for farms.  American fiction therefore unsurprisingly increased137
identification with conquerors, warriors, Indian fighters, tree fellers, and the
Southern way of life. Not all American fiction took this form, of course, but
enough so that readers who were attuned to it could readily find reinforcement
for their own brand of selective empathy.
A. Underdogs and Overlords in American Fiction
As has been seen, American fiction has often treated overlords and
conquerors sympathetically. At the same time, writers and moviemakers have
often drawn Indians, blacks, Mexicans, and the working class in disparaging
terms. When Great Britain went to war, its enemies were generally white
nations, such as France or Germany. When the United States went to war, the
enemy was often Native American or Mexican, at least in the early years.
British cartoons and novels would often paint the French in unflattering
terms—as effete, snail-eating people, for example—but not as uncouth
savages or tricky, shoot-you-in-the-back Mexicans.138
Some of the young nation’s most prominent fiction exemplified this
dichotomy. D.W. Griffith’s film The Birth of a Nation,  based on the novel139
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CRITICISM 215 (1990), for a discussion of the film and its influence.
140. THOMAS DIXON, THE CLANSMAN (1905). See ANTHONY SLIDE, AMERICAN RACIST: THE LIFE
AND FILMS OF THOMAS DIXON (2004).
141. See, e.g., CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR
CULTURE 126-27 (1990) (discussing the impact of scenes of black men (white actors in blackface) chasing
a white woman over a cliff to her death).
142. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 138, at 1265; see also SILK & SILK, supra note 141 (discussing
the movie’s impact on society).
143. GONE WITH THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). Based on the novel by Margaret Mitchell
(1936) by the same title, the movie depicts events in Georgia during and just after the Civil War.
144. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1995) (1852).
145. See WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, SLAVERY AND RACE IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 35-36
(1984) (positing that Uncle Tom’s long-suffering character was itself a stereotype and ultimately harmful
to the cause of black freedom and equality).
146. See, e.g., Susan Faludi, America’s Guardian Myths, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A29; JON
TUSKA, THE FILMING OF THE WEST (1976); JOHN E. O’CONNOR, HOLLYWOOD’S INDIAN: STEREOTYPES OF
NATIVE AMERICANS IN FILM (1980); ROY H. PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE
INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1965).
147. See CRANE, supra note 17, at 32, 90-91.
The Clansman  by Thomas Dixon and perhaps the most famous in140
Hollywood history, depicted the Southern way of life in rhapsodic terms. The
Civil War emerged as a tragedy for that region; newly freed blacks were
portrayed as rapacious beasts with designs on white women.  The movie141
played to packed houses for years, shaping the attitudes of millions of the new
immigrants who were flocking to the United States at this time.  A few years142
later, Gone With the Wind presented a similarly romanticized portrait of
Southern life, with loyal black servants who knew their places and white
plantation owners who struggled valiantly to hold on in the face of change.143
Even abolitionist writing, such as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s
Cabin,  portrayed gentle, long-suffering black philosophers such as Uncle144
Tom, not angry revolutionaries like Toussaint-L’Ouverture or Paul Robeson,
who despised inequality and opposed racism.  Cowboy and Indian tales145
portrayed the cowboy as a noble, modest, self-effacing protector of white
womanhood, while the Indians came across as bloodthirsty savages bent on
mayhem and destruction.  Most novels and short stories about war glorified146
it; the few that questioned it, such as Red Badge of Courage,  nevertheless147
found it bittersweet.
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148. E.g., MARY ROWLANDSON, THE SOVEREIGNTY AND GOODNESS OF GOD, TOGETHER WITH THE
FAITHFULNESS OF HIS PROMISES: DISPLAYED: BEING A NARRATIVE OF THE CAPTIVITY AND RESTORATION
OF MRS. MARY ROWLANDSON AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1682); COTTON MATHER, HUMILIATIONS
FOLLOWED WITH DELIVERANCE (1697); RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE
MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 1600-1860 (1973); FRANCES ROE KESSLER, THE INDIAN
CAPTIVITY NARRATIVE: A WOMAN’S VIEW (1990); Faludi, supra note 146.
149. E.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 93, at 741-45, 928, 1020-24 (on government boarding schools
and their treatment of Indian schoolchildren).
150. E.g., JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1826) (describing the feats and
travails of the noble warrior Uncas); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 138, at 1268 (describing mythical
Indians in Cooper’s writing).
151. See, e.g., SLOTKIN, supra note 148; TIMOTHY FLINT, BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF DANIEL BOONE
(1833); ZENAS LEONARD, NARRATIVE OF THE ADVENTURES OF ZENAS LEONARD (1839); Stephanie
LeManager, Trading Stories: Washington Irving and the Global West, in 15 AM. LIT. HIST. 683 (2003);
NELSON LEE, THREE YEARS AMONG THE COMANCHES: THE NARRATIVE OF NELSON LEE, THE TEXAS
RANGER 25-26 (2001); DAN DEQUILLE (William Wright), THE BIG BONANZA 79-84 (1969); Faludi, supra
note 146.
152. See, e.g., Stephen Crane, A Man and Some Others, 47 CENTURY MAG. 601 (1897) (recounting
the tale of a Mexican brute who kills “Bill,” a heroic Anglo cowboy who refused the Mexican’s demand
to leave his land, or else).
153. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 138, at 1261-70, 1273-75 (discussing three centuries of
depictions of these groups in popular culture); JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE SPY: A TALE OF THE
NEUTRAL GROUND 54-55 (AMS Press, Inc. 2002) (1852) (recounting a disparaging depiction of a black
slave); Joel Chandler Harris, Free Joe and the Rest of the World, 29 CENTURY MAG. 117-24 (1884) (same).
Entire genres of writing, such as Indian captivity tales,  titillated Anglo148
readers, especially females, with descriptions of virtuous young white women
carried away by bronze, loincloth-wearing savages and raised in captivity. In
reality, very few cases of Indian kidnapping ever occurred; many more Indian
children were forcibly removed from their families and sent to Indian boarding
schools, where Anglo authorities cut off their long hair, punished them for
speaking Indian languages, and taught them to hate their culture and dress and
act white.149
James Fenimore Cooper, perhaps the most sympathetic of the Anglo
storytellers about Indians, nevertheless depicted them as radically unlike white
men and women.  Frontier narratives, including stories about Daniel Boone,150
David Crockett, and Zenas Leonard, played to large audiences hungry for tales
of heroic trappers and Indian fighters overcoming all odds and fighting off
bears, sinkholes, interior icebergs, and other unlikely dangers on the way to
survival in the Wild West.  Even Steven Crane, who on occasion wrote151
admiringly of the Indians, wrote disparagingly of Mexicans.152
During much of the formative period of American literature, narratives
were rife with stereotypes of noble whites and ignoble Indians, blacks, and
Latinos.  Filmmaker Marlon Riggs’ award-winning one-hour documentary,153
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154. Ethnic Notions (PBS 1986).
155. Id. (Directed by Marlon Riggs, this prize winning documentary narrates over 300 years of
popular depiction of black people.); see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 138 (outlining a “functional
theory” of racial stereotyping). Not all American fiction treated minorities in such cavalier fashion. Sinclair
Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, Pietro Di Donato, John Steinbeck, and the abolitionists were conspicuous
exceptions.
156. HUNT, supra note 7, at 34-69.
157. See, e.g., Shane (Paramount Pictures 1953). Even after the pioneer era ended, the sheer size of
the United States makes it difficult for citizens to empathize and sympathize with each other. For example,
people in England and France find it more convenient and inexpensive to visit other countries than do the
citizens of the United States. Travel, of course, may lead to heightened understanding of one’s own culture,
as well as that of other regions. This would have been especially true before the advent of air travel, but it
holds true to some extent even today—less than ten percent of the U.S. population traveled abroad during
a recent year. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., OFFICE OF TRAVEL & TOURISM INDUS. &
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (2004); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 (2000). Also, American workers
typically receive fewer vacation days than their European counterparts, making “a month in the country”
(or in Italy) much more difficult to achieve. Chris Taylor, There’s More Vacation Time on Tap for You,
CNN.com, Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/03/technology/
fbvacations0803.biz2/index.htm.
Ethnic Notions,  depicted a parade of Sambos, mammies, coons, uncles, and154
devious—or hapless—African Americans in cartoons, household curios, and
art. As with other groups—Latinos, Asian Americans, Indians—the images
changed from era to era as white society needed reassurance, reason for
outright oppression, or a rationale for segregation.155
American fiction, then, especially the popular sort, promoted solidarity
and identification with the dominant group and emotional distance from
minorities, Indians, and the poor. In this respect, fiction played a quite
different role from the one Lynn Hunt traces in early English and Continental
writing.  To the extent that empathy, stemming from reading novels and156
short stories and watching film, is an important ingredient in the expansion of
human rights, it is easy to see how France and England would leave the United
States behind.
B. Material Forces: the New Nation’s Ways of Doing Business
Not only did the country’s literature promote empathy for those on the
top, in contrast to the kind of literature that was developing in England and
France, but material and structural forces also pushed in the same direction.
The geographically large, wide-open continent rewarded selfishness and
independence (a “pioneer spirit”).  And, a little later, a written Constitution157
slowed the pace of progress, since social change could not occur without
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158. I mean, of course, that social change would often require an amendment, such as the Thirteenth
repealing slavery, or else a determination of a law’s constitutionality, such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) (upholding the statutory regime of separate but equal railroad cars), overruled by Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also HUNT, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that the original Constitution
lacked a Bill of Rights and, instead of being universalistic in its approach, only protected certain individual
interests against governmental invasion).
A related structural feature is our federalist system, which ensures an ever-shifting balance of
power between the states and the federal government, especially with respect to the Tenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 1 (2005); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
A final structural feature is our moralistic streak. Stemming from our early Puritan heritage,
moralism often takes the form of overriding a state’s “compassionate” measures, such as California’s laws
permitting the medical use of marijuana to alleviate pain. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Someone who detests another person’s behavior on religious grounds is apt to show little empathy for the
predicament that drives the other person to behave that way.
159. The Enlightenment is the name for a period associated with writers, such as David Hume,
Immanuel Kant, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and John Locke, that emphasized the power of reason to
improve humanity’s condition. See, e.g., ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz
C.A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove trans., 1979) (1968).
160. During later times, our greater degree of diversity, especially racial, compared to Europe’s, may
well have suppressed the development of fellow-feeling and identification with the broad community.
Robert Putnam recently has shown how diverse groups, at least for a substantial initial period, “hunker
down,” invest less in the world outside their doors, watch TV, and cultivate less social capital compared
to groups that are more homogeneous. Robert Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007).
161. See Delgado, supra note 44, at 75-77 (explaining how the faculty of empathy benefits the
Supreme Court approval.  Great Britain, of course, lacked a constitution,158
which meant that social reforms, like the abolition of slavery, could come
about through parliamentary action alone.
Consider, too, that the colonists decamped for a life of log cabins, forts,
wagon trains, Indian raids, and other immediate physical challenges just as
Europe was entering the Enlightenment, arts were flourishing, and science was
advancing rapidly.  Although well educated colonials living in Boston or159
New York, such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin,
managed to keep up with developments and with continental writing that was
then full of talk of “the rights of man,” the average settler living on the frontier
had little way of doing so and probably even less inclination or time. These
structural features of life in the new nation—its wide open spaces, its
constitutional system, and its distance from the center of Enlightenment
thought—undoubtedly limited its ability to enter fully into world
developments that were rapidly expanding the scope of human rights.160
But the feature I want to highlight is empathy’s connection with the way
a society conducts business. In Great Britain, as mentioned, mercantilism
rewarded empathy, just as novel reading enhanced it.  A merchant who could161
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possessor).
162. See id.; see also Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574.
163. See generally Delgado, supra note 44.
164. The New England economy, especially in cities such as Boston or New York, was based on
trade, rather than large-scale farming, as in the agrarian South, or hunting, trapping, and ranching, as in the
West. See, e.g., MARGARET ELLEN NEWELL, FROM DEPENDENCY TO INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1998); ENGINES OF ENTERPRISE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
NEW ENGLAND (Peter Temin ed., 2000).
165. In other words, in these situations, empathy might serve a reverse-evolutionary function,
disabling its possessor from operating effectively. Surgeons learn to distance themselves—develop
detachment—from the patients on whom they are operating. Executioners presumably develop a matter-of-
fact frame of mind, and so on.
166. Cities like London and Birmingham were centers of trade and industry by the time U.S.
westward expansion began in earnest. See, e.g., MICHAEL BALL & DAVID SUNDERLAND, AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF LONDON, 1800-1914 (2001).
167. See, e.g., UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Clare Virginia Eby ed., W.W. Norton & Company
2003) (1906).
168. The development of unions, of course, accelerated this trend.
169. See TRATTNER, supra note 112; Nardinelli, supra note 113.
170. See generally PEREA ET AL., supra note 93, at 110-12 (discussing these clauses, which are still
in the Constitution).
place himself or herself in the shoes of customers or competitors might gain
a vital edge.  He or she could make advantageous trades, aided by knowledge162
of what the other party wanted.  The same held true of New England, where163
trade and manufacturing required that buyers and sellers, and employers and
workers, deal with each other and strike bargains.  A settler economy or one164
based on labor-intensive farming or extraction (gold mining, hunting, trapping
furs, or logging) placed no such premium on human empathy. Indeed, a slave
owner who identified overly with his slaves would find it harder to exploit
them, just as a settler who hesitated to cut down a stand of old-growth trees
would lose out in competition to one who quickly lifted the axe.165
England, by this time, was almost entirely mercantile.  And, of course,166
capitalism and the factory system could be cruel too.  Yet, it was at least167
required that shop owners or factory operators negotiate with their hired
hands.  Parliament could, and did, pass child labor laws.  In the United168 169
States, a slave owner did not have to negotiate with his slaves, and neither
Congress nor the states could abolish slavery or limit the slave trade due to the
six “slavery clauses” in the original Constitution.170
As noted, empathy will often benefit its possessor. If one has the ability
to grasp what another person—a lover, a child, a partner in business—wants,
one can offer the person what she is hungering for and hope to receive
something in return. As law and economics would put it, empathy, whether
gained from reading novels or from direct experience, ought to confer an
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171. Delgado, supra note 44, at 75-76.
172. In such an environment, one often thinks solely about survival.
173. In such settings, the opportunities for learning—and receiving reinforcement for—empathy are
fewer than in ones that afford more social interaction. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 44.
174. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 44, at 75-76; see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
175. With short-term profits, one is relatively unconcerned with long-term relationships, which are
built on trust and reciprocity and are capable of extending over a long period of time. Instead, one seeks the
quick return. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Third Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive
Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1993).
evolutionary advantage on its possessor, enabling him or her to succeed as a
parent, friend, lover, trader, politician, or business person.  The empathic171
person can make shrewd offers of exchanges in a way more likely to succeed
than the person lacking such ability.
But empathy does not come easily. Living in a rude, threatening
environment can sidetrack its development,  just as living in a modern,172
highly bureaucratized setting where human relationships are distant and
impersonal can.  Extreme inequality in society would also inhibit its173
development, since there is little point to cultivating a close relationship with
a destitute stranger who has little to trade.  Unbridled capitalism probably174
can as well, since it places profits, especially those of the short-term variety,
above all else.175
Still, in most settings, empathy is an advantage and one of the most prized
human traits. It makes others eager to deal with you and feel reassured that
you will reciprocate their friendship. That is why, all things being equal, we
are apt to trust and value the friendship of a well read, humanistically trained
person. And it is why nations who “fall behind the curve”—for structural or
material reasons, or because of the type of literature they wrote and
consumed—in developing fellow feeling and a respect for human rights will
find themselves pursuing a lonely path. Should it be surprising, then, that the
United States lags behind the rest of the world in signing human rights and
environmental treaties, in repudiating torture and harsh punishments, and in
providing first-rate education and health care to all its citizens? One benefit
of Lynn Hunt’s book is that it invites introspection about national culture,
reading habits, and their relationship to participation in the world. But the
more subversive lesson—and the deepest of all—is that the nation that allows
itself to remain in the rearguard of vital human movements will eventually pay
the price in a suppressed economy, poor trading relations, and an inability to
persuade others to join it in geopolitical actions that it considers necessary to
its way of life.
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CONCLUSION
If human rights are expanding, as Hunt writes, under the impact of
increasing exposure to other human beings, what does this mean for the party
of social reform?
If she is right, the force that underlies the expansion of human rights is
empathy, a complex set of emotions that come into play at the sight of fellow
human beings suffering. We must first, however, come to see those beings as
“like us.”
She shows that a prime means by which persons broaden their sympathies
is literature, especially fiction. Through imaginative identification with the
characters of a novel or story, the reader comes to see members of stigmatized
outgroups as fellow beings deserving respect and concern.
What follows from this? First, minorities should tell their stories often
and insistently.  They should also circulate counterstories, tales, and176
narratives designed to jar complacent majoritarian scripts, such as “without
intent no discrimination,” “colorblindness” as the best strategy, or the myth
of upward mobility—that anyone can make it in this country who so desires.177
Members of these groups should also affirm their own carnality: “We
have bodies—we bleed, cry, and hurt just like you.” At the same time that they
seek to increase imaginative identification with themselves and their struggles,
they should also gently remind mainstream society of the utility of bringing
Latinos, blacks, women, and gays into their community and economy.
They should further point out that pursuing the opposite course will
impose costs—some material and others personal. America today needs allies
and goodwill in the difficult period that will accompany adjusting free-market
capitalism to a global marketplace, while at the same time waging a war on
terror.  A second set of costs is more personal: We now look back with178
incredulity on previous generations who relocated Indians, enslaved blacks,
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denied women the right to vote or divorce, burned witches, slaughtered enemy
civilians, and tortured those who we believed were withholding information
we wanted.  If, as Hunt points out, human rights are expanding, it follows179
that some practices that we tolerate today will come to seem reprehensible and
wrong, so that our children will ask, “How could we have done that?”180
Establishing new human rights, or even defending old ones during bad
times, is hard work. Lynn Hunt’s book suggests approaches for
reformers—storytelling and appeals to self-interest—that we have known
about for some time. But her book also shows exactly why it is important to
deploy those tools, the conditions under which they are likely to succeed, and,
implicitly, why the United States has sometimes been slow to adopt new
protections for vulnerable groups—flesh of our flesh—or, sometimes, for
people who simply were inconvenient and in the way.
